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Introduction
MANUEL FRAGANTE IMMIGRATED TO HAWAII AT THE AGE
OF 60.1 Upon arrival, he began searching for a job.2 He applied for a
clerk position at the City of Honolulu’s Division of Motor Vehicles
and Licensing.3 The position required taking an exam that tested
“among other things, word usage, grammar and spelling.”4 Fragante
scored the highest out of 721 test-takers.5 Shortly after, he was inter-
viewed for the position.6 During the interview, the interviewers had a
difficult time understanding Fragante due to his accent.7 The em-
ployer concluded that Fragante’s accent “would interfere with his per-
formance of certain aspects of the job.”8 As a result, Fragante dropped
from the first to the third position on the list of applicants qualified
and eligible for the position.9 Fragante subsequently filed a Title VII
claim alleging accent discrimination.10 At the trial, two expert wit-
nesses testified that, even though Fragante spoke with a heavy accent,
his speech was comprehensible, however due to a history of discrimi-
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1. Fragante v. Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1989).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 594.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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nation against foreign accents like his, listeners may “turn off” and not
understand him.11
Similarly, Sophia Poskocil, an immigrant from Colombia, in-
terned as a student teacher for a high school while working on her
teaching certification.12 Her supervisor highly rated her teaching skills
and wrote her a strong recommendation letter.13 However, Poskocil
was denied a regular full-time teaching position at the same high
school.14 Over six years, she applied nineteen times, and each time
her application was denied.15 Poskocil brought a claim alleging na-
tional origin discrimination.16 During the trial, the high school
claimed they based their decision not to hire Poskocil on poor student
evaluations.17 Students complained that Poskocil’s accent created dif-
ficulty understanding her and that “she barely spoke English.”18 The
Court agreed with the school’s argument that Poskocil’s accent inter-
fered with her communication skills, even though Poskocil was apply-
ing for a position as a Spanish teacher.19
In contrast, Patricia Lee, born in China, obtained her medical
degree from the National Taiwan University College of Medicine.20
Lee moved to the United States and worked as a physician at the Vet-
erans Administration Medical Center for fifteen years.21 During that
time, she was denied a promotion on several occasions.22 Lee heard
complaints about her accent from the superiors on a number of occa-
sions.23 On one occasion, a supervisor was angry with her when he was
unable to understand her.24 A different supervisor would not talk to
her unless someone else was present and could interpret what she was
saying.25 Lee sued the Center alleging race and national origin dis-
11. Id. at 597–98.
12. Poskocil v. Roanoke County Sch. Div., 1999 WL 15938, at *2–3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 11,
1999).
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 5–6.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 5, n.2 (“For example, some students wrote in their evaluations that ‘the
teacher’s lack of English made it hard to ask questions,’ or that the ‘instructor barely spoke
English, was hard to understand.’”).
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Lee v. Walters, 1988 WL 105887, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1988).
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 4–5.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id.
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crimination.26 The Center argued that Lee’s credentials from the
Taiwanese University were inadequate because she failed the board
certification in internal medicine.27 The court denied this argument,
holding that it was pretext for discrimination.28 The court explained
that even though the accent was “quite noticeable,” it did not hinder
her ability to communicate and she should not have been denied a
promotion for it.29
These are just a few stories that demonstrate the prevalence of
accent discrimination in the workplace. President Franklin Roosevelt
espoused to Americans that, “all of our people all over the country, all
except the pure-blooded Indians, are immigrants, or descendants of
immigrants, including even those who came over here on the
Mayflower.”30 In this one statement, Roosevelt articulated that with
the lone exception of Native Americans, every American initially came
over with a non-indigenous accent.
The United States workforce is constantly changing due to the
flow of immigrants. The increasingly visible Latino, African American,
and Asian populations in the United States invites reexamination of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.31 Indeed, scholars discuss
whether Title VII is an adequate legal tool for addressing the present
and future forms of discrimination likely to be experienced in a more
diverse workforce.32 Today, the term “national origin” discrimination
connotes discrimination based on a person’s cultural traits. However,
to provide a sound and comprehensive basis for protecting employees
from discrimination because of ethnic traits, the term “national ori-
gin” and its framework must be reevaluated.
This Comment will show that while Title VII prohibits an em-
ployer from discriminating against any individual with respect to his
or her compensation, terms, condition, or privileges of employment
because of that individual’s national origin, the linguistic characteris-
tics, such as an individual’s accent should be protected under national
origin. Thus, this Comment will argue that accent discrimination
should be considered per se prima facie national origin discrimina-
tion and that an employer’s only defense is to prove a reevaluated
26. Id. at 1.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 19.
30. Text of Roosevelt’s Final Campaign Addressing Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1944, at 38.
31. Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination
under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 809 (1994).
32. Id.
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Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) defense with stricter
requirements, including a rejection of the customer preference
defense.
To illustrate the effect the current statute has on discriminated
employees, Part I will discuss both the legislative history and the evolv-
ing jurisprudence surrounding accent discrimination. In the statute’s
current state, it does not address Title VII’s prohibition of discrimina-
tion based on national origin. This Comment will also discuss how the
jurisprudence surrounding accent discrimination fails to equate ac-
cent discrimination to national origin discrimination. Part II will ex-
plain the current framework courts use and the rules surrounding the
determination of a significant discriminatory impact in passing an em-
ployee over for a job based on a foreign accent. Part III will discuss the
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (“BFOQ”) defense. Part IV will
provide suggestions on how courts should approach accent discrimi-
nation lawsuits.
I. Defining National Origin Discrimination: Accent
Discrimination, To Be or Not To Be?
Generally, national origin discrimination suggests treating some-
one less favorably because the individual or their ancestors are from a
certain place or belong to a particular national origin group.33 Specifi-
cally, Title VII prohibits discrimination against a person because he or
she is associated with a particular national origin.34
Facially, however, the language of Title VII does not prohibit ac-
cent discrimination.35 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (“EEOC”) Guidelines prohibit “employment discrimination
against an individual because she has physical, linguistic, and/or cul-
tural characteristics closely associated with a national origin group.36
This Comment seeks to discuss how linguistic traits should be given
heightened protection in the judicial system.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (defining “National Origin Discrimination”).
34. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Compl. Man. § 13: NATIONAL ORIGIN DIS-
CRIMINATION (2002).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1.
36. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Compl. Man. § 13: NATIONAL ORIGIN
DISCRIMINATION (2002) (“National origin discrimination includes discrimination because a
person comes from a particular place.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (“The Commission defines
national origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the denial of equal
employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of
origin.”).
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A. Legislative History of National Origin Discrimination
Although Title VII prohibits discrimination based on national ori-
gin, the prohibition against “national origin” discrimination remains
vague and ineffective. The legislative history of the term “national ori-
gin” consists of a few paragraphs during the House debate.37
Initially, Congress stated its understanding of what “national ori-
gin” meant.38 Congressman Roosevelt made it clear that “national ori-
gin” meant the country from which a person came.39 He also stated
that the term has “nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of an
individual. A man may have migrated here from Great Britain and still
be a colored person.”40
Congressmen Rodino and Dent further discussed instances in
which “a person of a certain national origin may be specifically re-
quired to meet the qualifications of a particular job.”41 The Congress-
men discussed a hypothetical situation where restaurants served the
food of a particular nation.42 Within the context of a restaurant, they
concluded that an individual’s national origin in the operation of a
specialty restaurant serving food like a “pizza pie” could properly be
an occupational qualification that is reasonably necessary to the oper-
ation of the restaurant.43 Additionally, Congressman Roosevelt linked
language and national origin suggesting that the “national origin” def-
inition of the statute encompassed language requirements.44
The debate continued in the Senate when Senator Humphrey
mentioned the term “ethnic origin.”45 However, Senator Humphrey
neither clarified the term nor differentiated it from national origin.46
Senator Kuchel commented briefly on the problems faced by “a Ne-
gro or Puerto Rican or an Indian or a Japanese American or an Amer-
ican of Mexican descent.”47
Although discussion over Title VII resulted in what some consider
the longest debate in Senate history, the Supreme Court has charac-
terized the legislative history of the statutory phrase “national origin”
37. Perea, supra note 31, at 821.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 818.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 818–19.
42. Id. at 819.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 820.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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as “quite meager.”48 Not only has national origin ended up in Title VII
as a part of the “boilerplate” statutory language of fair employment
without any meaningful definition, but Congress has also ignored ac-
cent discrimination faced by ethnic minorities.49
B. EEOC Guidelines for National Origin Discrimination
As a federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission enforces Title VII.50 The EEOC defines national origin dis-
crimination broadly to include discrimination based on an
individual’s physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics.51
The EEOC has interpreted the phrase “national origin” to extend
Title VII protection to bar discrimination against persons with charac-
teristics closely correlated with national origin.52 An example of dis-
crimination based on cultural traits includes discrimination against
someone wearing traditional African dress, even if that person is not
African.53 The EEOC explained that discrimination can be based on
perception, such as an “employer’s belief that an individual is a mem-
ber of a particular national origin group—an employer may perceive
someone as Arab based on his speech, mannerism, and
appearance.”54
Moreover, an accent is an important and fundamental aspect of a
person’s ethnicity and national origin. Ethnicity refers to physical and
cultural characteristics that make a social group distinctive, either
from the perspective of group members or the perspective of outsid-
ers.55 Ethnicity consists of a set of ethnic traits that are inherent to the
culture the person grew up with. These traits may include, but are not
limited to, race, history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which
contribute to a sense of distinctiveness among members of the
group.56
In its Guidelines of National Origin Discrimination, the EEOC
defines national origin discrimination to include the “denial of equal
employment opportunity because . . . an individual has the . . . linguis-
48. Id. at 821.
49. Id. at 817.
50. Id. at 844.
51. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Compl. Man. § 13: NATIONAL ORIGIN DIS-
CRIMINATION (2002).
52. Id.
53. § 13(II)(B): NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION (2002).
54. Id.
55. Perea, supra note 31, at 833.
56. Id.
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tic characteristics of a national origin group.”57 The Ninth Circuit
elaborated on linguistic characteristics as a component of national
origin:
Accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined
in many cases. It would therefore be an easy refuge in this context
for an employer unlawfully discriminating against someone based
on national origin to state falsely that it was not the person’s na-
tional origin that caused the employment or promotion problem,
but the candidate’s inability to measure up to the communication
skills demanded by the job.58
Although an accent is different from protected characteristics
like race or sex, it is “practically immutable,”59 and as a result, must be
protected by Title VII.
C. National Origin Identity: Accent As an Immutable Characteristic
In a Due Process or Equal Protection Constitutional analysis,
courts evaluate the concept of immutable characteristics to determine
whether a group of people are considered part of a discrete and insu-
lar minority.60 However, courts have paid insufficient attention to im-
mutability in accent discrimination cases.61
The term “immutable characteristic” can be defined as an “acci-
dent of birth,” a characteristic that cannot be changed, or a trait that
is so fundamental to the identity of an individual.62 Examples of traits
that individuals have from the moment they are born are: “race, color,
genetic makeup, many disabilities, and national origin.”63 These char-
acteristics cannot be altered. Similarly, as explained below, after the
age of nine, accents cannot be altered and thus should be considered
an immutable characteristic, worthy of greater protection.64
A study of 109 speakers found that in cases of a new language
acquired before the age of seven, there is no accent transferred past
57. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Compl. Man. § 13: NATIONAL ORIGIN DIS-
CRIMINATION (2002).
58. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596.
59. Juan Perea, English-Only Rules and the Right to Speak One’s Primary Language in the
Workplace, 23 U. MICH. J.L REF. 265, 265–74 (1990).
60. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law,
52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1508 (2011); see also United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
61. See Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596 (the Ninth Circuit upholding the rejection of an
applicant whose heavy accent was likely to create communication difficulties without giving
proper consideration to accent immutability).
62. Hoffman, supra note 60, at 1509.
63. Id. at 1515.
64. See infra Part 1.C.
352 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51
the age of seven.65 From the age of seven to the age of nine, the likeli-
hood of having a speech accent in the child’s second language is very
likely.66 After nine, the chance of accent-free speech is close to 50%.67
As the child becomes older, the individual’s chances of speaking with-
out an accent becomes minuscule.68 Therefore, when employers ar-
gue that plaintiffs can take accent reduction courses to improve the
skill of the language, the employers are discriminating against an attri-
bute of the plaintiff that is beyond their control, which is indicative of
national origin.69
However, the framers of Title VII did not expand on the meaning
of national origin to include accent discrimination, nor did they spec-
ify what traits were attributable to national origin.70 As the study
demonstrated, an individual’s accent can become an immutable char-
acteristic that cannot be altered. Thus, an individual’s accent is a char-
acteristic that warrants greater Title VII protection.
D. Accent Discrimination Issues and Policy Concerns: Society’s
Commitment to Diversity
Courts have been extremely unsympathetic to claims of discrimi-
nation by someone whose ethnicity differs from the majority.71 As a
result, an employee who speaks with a “foreign accent” may be fired
or denied a promotion, in spite of excellent qualifications and skills,
because of the “discomfort and displeasure” he has caused as a result
of his accent.72 Despite Title VII’s prohibitions against national origin
discrimination, situations involving accent discrimination are some-
times not included.73
As a result, courts interpret Title VII in a manner that, “encour-
ages uniformity and the rejection of ethnic differences” rather than
65. Beatrice Nguyen, Accent Discrimination and the Test of Spoken English: A Call for an
Objective Assessment of the Comprehensibility of Nonnative Speakers, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1325,
1330–31 (1993) (explaining the experiment done in Sonia Tahta et al., Foreign Accents:
Factors Relating to Transfer of Accent From the First Language to a Second Language, 24 LANGUAGE
& SPEECH 265 (1981)).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1331.
69. Id.
70. Joanna Carey Smith, Emerging Issues: National Origin Discrimination in Employment,
POPULAR ‘GOV’T (2002), at 17–18, available at http://www.sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicver
sions/pg/pgfal02/article2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G2N-S82K].
71. Perea, supra note 31, at 807–08.
72. Id. at 808.
73. Id.
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“encouraging equality and tolerance of difference.”74 Courts often de-
fer to the employers’ decision to deny employment because an appli-
cant’s accent is “too foreign” or “excessive.”75 A court’s protection
depends on a broad construction of “national origin” that finds no
support in the statute’s language or legislative history.76
In Fragante, based on one statement in the entire trial, the judge
came to the conclusion that Fragante was too difficult to understand
because he had a “difficult manner of pronunciation.”77 Not only do
courts fail to consider all the evidence, they also fail to place meaning-
ful value on accent discrimination cases, “underestimating the harm
done to qualified employees when they are denied jobs because of
their accents.”78 The most fundamental question is how current judi-
cial reasoning in accent discrimination cases supports policies that are
intended to incorporate immigrants who come from different coun-
tries and have different cultural backgrounds.
The Civil Rights Act was the first comprehensive legislation to ad-
dress the problem of discrimination in American society.79 With time,
the Civil Rights Act became the foundation for equal employment op-
portunity laws.80 In contrast to other countries that have been unable
to accept the concept of equality and differences between ethnic
groups, the United States offers political and economic freedom to
immigrants and their descendants. Even though history points to the
fact that protection for “national origin” is an afterthought—origi-
nally intended as a “boilerplate”81—the substantial growth in the na-
tional labor force of ethnic groups should force the judicial system to
reevaluate the existing Title VII statute. The possibility of eliminating
existing tension between employers and employees over linguistics dif-
ferences is certainly feasible.
74. Id. at 809.
75. Id. at 830.
76. Id.
77. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 598.
78. Braden Beard, No Mere “Matter of Choice”: The Harm of Accent Preferences and English-
Only Rules, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1495, 1506 (2013).
79. Perea, supra note 31, at 806.
80. Id. at 809.
81. Id. at 811.
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II. Disparate Treatment Theory in Workplace Discrimination
Cases
Under Title VII, a plaintiff may prove discrimination under a “dis-
parate treatment theory” or a “disparate impact theory.”82 Typically,
plaintiffs who allege accent discrimination are limited to claiming dis-
parate treatment. In disparate treatment cases, the plaintiff must
demonstrate the employer’s intent to discriminate on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.83
A. Lack of Clear Method for Accent Discrimination Cases
Typically courts adopt the Burdine analysis for evaluating dispa-
rate treatment cases.84 Under Burdine, the plaintiff must prove by the
preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.85 To
meet the burden, the plaintiff must prove four elements established in
McDonnell Douglas that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2)
he was qualified for the position; (3) an adverse employment action
was taken against him; and (4) that adverse employment action “oc-
curred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimina-
tion.”86 The burden of establishing a prima facie case is “not
onerous.”87 Each case is decided on the facts.88 Generally, a plaintiff
who is not hired based on his accent can establish a prima facie case
of national origin discrimination.89
After the plaintiff has met the prima facie case, the burden shifts
to the employer.90 The employer must establish that he actually took
the adverse action because of some “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason.”91 For an employer to have an acceptable business reason for
discriminating against a plaintiff because of his accent, the employer
must show that the accent “interferes materially with job perform-
ance.”92 Once the employer establishes a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
82. Nguyen, supra note 65, at 1331.
83. Id.
84. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
85. Id. at 252–53.
86. Id. at 253–54.
87. Id. at 253.
88. Id. at 253 n.4.
89. Carino v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents, 750 F 2d. 815, 819 (10th Cir.
1984).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596–97.
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tory reason, the plaintiff can attempt to show that the stated reason
was actually a pretext for a prohibited motivation.93
The plaintiff can also claim disparate treatment under a mixed-
motive framework.94 In Price Waterhouse, the court established that
under this framework, the employee would have to show that even if
the employer had legitimate reasons for taking an adverse action
against the employee, the employee’s protected trait was still imper-
missibly considered.95 However, the plaintiff must prove that the em-
ployer discriminated intentionally.96 Under the disparate treatment
theory, the plaintiff can assert systematic or individual disparate
treatment.97
Regardless of whether a court follows a Burdine or Price Waterhouse
analysis, the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of persuasion that he
was discriminated against based on an illegitimate reason.98 In mixed
motive cases, the employer’s burden is greater.99 The employer must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have discrim-
inated absent illegitimate motives.100
The lack of a clear approach became evident in Fragante, where
the court tried to follow the Burdine analysis.101 First, the District
Court ruled for the employer finding that the decision to deny Fra-
gante the job was justified based on the BFOQ defense.102 The Ninth
Circuit, in its original decision, affirmed its reasoning based on the
BFOQ defense.103 In the amended opinion, the court disregarded its
original decision based on the BFOQ defense, but nevertheless ruled
in favor of the employer on the ground that the employer articulated
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting Fragante from the
position.104 Further, Fragante failed to show that the employer’s ex-
planation was pretextual.105
93. Id. at 595
94. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989).
95. Id. at 242.
96. Id. at 230–31.
97. Id. at 266.
98. Id. at 230.
99. Id. at 252.
100. Id. at 229.
101. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 595.
102. Id. at 593.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 599.
105. Id.
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B. Judicial Interpretation of Accent Discrimination Cases
Perhaps, lack of a clear, direct definition for the phrase “national
origin” is the reason for an insufficient judicial approach in evaluating
employers’ liability in accent discrimination cases.106 Courts can freely
shift their attention to different elements of the case; in some cases,
courts have accepted employers’ argument that a communication er-
ror was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, in other instances,
courts concentrated on the burden of proving pretext.107 As a result,
there is a lack of focus on the standard that courts will find sufficient
for a plaintiff to be successful. Thus, courts create a virtually impossi-
ble hurdle for employees to prove that discrimination was based on
their accent.
1. Lack of Effective Communication as a Legitimate,
Nondiscriminatory Reason
Typically, courts find that a person’s accent serves as a surrogate
for national origin discrimination if the accent is not related to a legit-
imate feature of the employment.108 Courts concentrate on whether
the defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
accent discrimination. In Fragante, the Court added a note of caution
stating that accent and national origin are inextricably intertwined in
many cases.109 Therefore, employers that may feel protected to dis-
criminate against national origin by falsely stating that it was not the
person’s national origin, but the employee’s inability to measure up to
positions demanding communication skills are not protected.110 The
Fragante court stated, “an adverse employment decision may be predi-
106. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964) (The Congressmen argued on the definition of
“national origin” throughout the record.).
107. See generally Fragante 888 F.2d 591 (1989). See also Carino v. University of
Oklahoma Bd. Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The defendants assert that
the plaintiff was ‘demoted’ because he was hired for his technical skills and was given the
supervisor title in the first place only to increase his salary. Record, vol. 1, at 140. The court
found this proffered reason to be a pretext.”).
108. Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co. 461 F. Supp. 894, 924 (D.N.J. 1978), vacated Kyriazi v.
Western Elec. Co., 473 F.Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1979) (“While it is clear that plaintiff does
speak with an accent, and that at times she is difficult to understand, this is principally
because she is extremely soft spoken. Nonetheless, none of this stood in the way of her
obtaining two graduate degrees at Columbia, more than satisfactory ratings from at least
some Western supervisors and literally glowing endorsements from subsequent
employers.”).
109. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 597.
110. Id. at 596.
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cated upon an individual’s accent when—but only when—it interferes
materially with job performance.”111
In Carino, the plaintiff had a noticeable Filipino accent and was
improperly denied a position as a dental laboratory supervisor where
his accent did not interfere with his ability to perform supervisory
tasks.112 Carino held that “a foreign accent that does not interfere with
a Title VII claimant’s ability to perform duties of the position he has
been denied is not a legitimate justification for adverse employment
decisions.”113 A similar court’s approach is found in Berke, where the
court held that an employee’s “pronounced” Polish accent whose
command of English was “well above that of the average adult Ameri-
can” was improperly denied two positions because of her accent.114
However, courts are suspect about prejudicial comments regard-
ing an employee’s accent, thus making it difficult for a plaintiff to
prove pretext.115
2. Evidence of Intent or Motive: Difficulty of Proving Pretext
After the prima facie case and the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason have been established, the plaintiff has a chance of proving
pretext.116 The job requirement is one of the most significant factors
in determining whether an accent is pretext for national origin dis-
crimination.117 For example, a job requirement that specifies effective
communication with customers could be a pretext for accent discrimi-
nation.118 Consequently, for professions such as teachers, employers
may legitimately consider a person’s ability to effectively
communicate.119
111. Id.
112. Carino, 750 F.2d. at 819.
113. Id.
114. Berke v. Ohio Dep’t of Public Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir. 1980).
115. See Watt v. New York Botanical Garden, 2000 WL 193626, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (A
statement such as: “I can’t understand the way you speak” regarding the plaintiff’s accent
does not suggest an underlying bias to Jamaicans when the manager hired a person in the
protected class and therefore it would be unlikely for the manager to “suddenly develop an
aversion to members of that class.”).
116. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 229.
117. 45 Fed. Reg. 85,632, 85,633 (Dec. 29, 1980) (preamble to “Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of National Origin”) (“Many commentators strongly supported this revi-
sion of the Guidelines and indicated that these Guidelines would be beneficial in achieving
equal job opportunities for all individuals regardless of their national origin, or their cul-
tural or linguistic characteristics.”).
118. Poskocil, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 259 at *2–3.
119. Id. at 11
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In Poskocil, the Court recognized that a professor’s accent could
be a “legitimate issue” for evaluation.120 Thus, the court concluded,
there was nothing improper about an employer making an honest as-
sessment of the oral communication skills of a candidate for a job
when such skills are reasonably related to job performance.121 The
court accepted the employer’s argument that accent was a factor and
a legitimate consideration in light of the importance of verbal com-
munication in the classroom while hiring a teacher.122
Then, the burden shifted to Poskocil to establish pretext. The ar-
gument that “native speakers don’t always make the best foreign lan-
guage teachers” was not considered a discriminatory remark
demonstrating bias against native speakers.123 Rather, the court
treated it as a neutral statement, insufficient to establish pretext.124
The employer argued that plaintiff’s termination was due to her
“modeling” of language, pronunciation, and “idiomatic English.”125
The court found that the employer did not appear to have made any
facially discriminatory remarks and as an English as a second language
teacher, Poskocil’s usage of proper English understandably bore some
relationship to her job performance.126
Similarly, in Fragante the court found that a failure to hire a quali-
fied Filipino based on his oral ability to effectively communicate in
English was reasonably related to the normal operations of the clerk
position.127 Fragante tried to rebut the presumption by arguing that
the selection and evaluation procedures used by the employer were
deficient rendering the proffered reason for non-selection as a pre-
text for national origin discrimination.128 The court disagreed, hold-
ing that, in spite of the process being imperfect, it was insufficient to
establish intent.129
Again, a refusal to promote a Dominican immigrant for a hotel
front desk position was not found to be discriminatory due to the
“plaintiff’s language barrier” and the alleged hotel requirement “for
120. Id. (citing Hou v. Com. of Pa., Dep’t of Educ., Slippery Rock State College, 573 F.
Supp 1539, 1547 (W.D. Pa. 1983)).
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id. at 16–18.
124. Id. at 18.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 597.
128. Id. at 598.
129. Id.
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greater English proficiency than the plaintiff can exhibit.”130 The
court accepted the business necessity defense from the employer and
stated that the employer showed, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the employer believed in good faith that the plaintiff would not
have been able to competently perform the duties of the position she
sought.131
However, courts treat discriminatory remarks about an em-
ployee’s accent not connected to business necessity or effective com-
munication as pretext.132 In Xieng, the court questioned the
employer’s reasons for failure to promote the plaintiff when the plain-
tiff received positive job performance evaluations and recommenda-
tions for promotions.133 The court found the employer’s explanation
was pretextual and “not worthy of credence.”134
In Kyriazi, the court found that in spite of the plaintiff speaking
with an accent, the accent did not interfere with her ability to acquire
three degrees, two of them from prestigious universities in the United
States.135 The court noted that the achievement of a “B average at
Columbia by a recent immigrant cannot be so lightly brushed
aside.”136 Finally, the court questioned how the plaintiff could be con-
sidered unable to communicate effectively while receiving “above ex-
pected” ratings for her work.137 The court agreed that the plaintiff
spoke with an accent, and at times it was difficult to understand her,
but that was due to her being extremely soft spoken, and not her
accent.138
III. The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense in
the Workplace
The existing framework in accent discrimination cases omit the
importance of accent discrimination as per se national origin discrimi-
nation. As a result, the accepted framework for accent cases lack
130. Mejia v. New York Sheraton Hotel, 459 F. Supp. 375, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
131. Id. at 378
132. Akouri v. Fla. DOT, 408 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir. 2005) (“They are all white and
they are not going to take orders from you, especially if you have an accent,” was sufficient
to establish discrimination.).
133. Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash., 821 P.2d 520, 525 (Wash. 1991) (where the
court also questioned the employer’s allegation that the plaintiff was an unsatisfactory em-
ployee with a poor performance evaluation).
134. Id. at 525.
135. Kyriazi, 461 F. Supp. at 925.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 925.
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mechanisms that address whether the decision to discriminate was
based on conscious or unconscious bias. In cases where the decision
was unconscious, it is impossible for the plaintiff to establish pretext.
A better approach to these cases is to recognize accent discrimination
is per se national origin discrimination, and that the only employer
defense available should be the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
defense. However, the BFOQ needs to be amended to prohibit cus-
tomer preference as a defense to accent discrimination cases.
A. Conscious and Unconscious Accent Discrimination
A complicating factor in applying the existing Title VII frame-
work to accent discrimination cases is that a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive for making a
job-related action.139 In Fragante, the court reasoned that there was no
discriminatory intent or motive based on the connection between Fra-
gante’s “pronounced accent” and his job requirement as a clerk.140
Professor Matsuda criticized the court’s acceptance of the “diffi-
cult to understand defense.”141 Matsuda argues that more often than
not it is challenging to determine if the accent actually affects job per-
formance or if it differs from the “some preferred norm imposed,
whether consciously or subconsciously, by the employer.”142 Further,
Matsuda explains that pretext by its very definition involves a con-
scious choice to discriminate.143 Thus, the requirement for the plain-
tiff to establish pretext is pointless.144
However, the situation differs in cases where accent discrimina-
tion is unconscious. According to Donald Rubin, the speaker’s accent
and the lack of comprehension may not be the main problem.145 In
an experiment where a group of listeners heard audiotapes with the
same words spoken in different accents, the study found that the level
of comprehension was different depending on whom the listeners see
at the time they are listening to the tapes.146 In one experiment, sixty-
139. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000(e)–(k)(1)(A)(i).
140. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 598.
141. Mari J. Matsuda, Voices Of America: Accent Antidiscrimination Law and a Jurisprudence
for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1332 (1991) (citing Fragante v. City of Hono-
lulu, 888 F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1989)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1352.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Donald L. Rubin, Nonlanguage Factors Affecting Undergraduates’ Judgments of Nonna-
tive English-Speaking Teaching Assistants, 33 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 511, 514–518 (1992).
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two North American undergraduates listened to a four-minute record-
ing.147 As the students listened to the lecture presented by a university
instructor, they saw a photograph of the speaker on the screen.148 The
speaker was either a Caucasian woman or an Asian woman.149 The
same speaker, a native English speaker from Ohio, spoke on all of the
tapes.150 At the end of the experiment, the comprehension test scores
were lower for the group that observed an Asian speaker than for the
group that observed the Caucasian speaker.151 The experiment
showed that when the students were presented with a photograph of
the Asian speaker the accent was perceived as more foreign.152 The
study explained that, due to cultural stereotypes, listeners attach ac-
cepted norms to the speaker they are facing.153 As a result, listeners
may not even be aware that they are being discriminatory, thus creat-
ing an unconscious bias.154
Further, accents are sometimes equated to ineffective communi-
cation. However, people are capable of understanding each other by
adjusting to different intonations and pronunciations.155 Matsuda sug-
gests that French and Italian accents are charming.156 She further sug-
gests that individuals tend to associate certain accents “with wealth
and power.”157 While at other times, accents can be deterring and
“low class.”158 When this is the case, courts must deal with the issue of
pure prejudice.159 Accents that are not charming are often considered
“untrustworthy,” even though accents have nothing to do with the
honesty and sincerity of a person who has the accent.160 Matsuda ar-
gues that listeners tend to attach cultural meaning to an accent that
often creates negative impressions and associations.161
Regardless of the link between the accent and the job in ques-
tion, the employer may discriminate due to the unconscious bias that
is a result of stereotypical norms. The employer unconsciously as-
147. Id. at 514.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 515.
151. Id. at 518.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Matsuda, supra note 141, at 1355.
155. Id. at 1362.
156. Id. at 1352, 1364.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1364.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1377.
161. Id.
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sumes that the plaintiff’s accent will impair the job performance when
in fact it will not.
B. A Redefined BFOQ as an Employer’s Defense
The majority of accent discrimination cases are brought under
the disparate treatment theory. This Comment argues that the BFOQ
defense should be re-evaluated. The BFOQ exception applies when an
employer can prove that an employment preference based on one of
these protected class characteristics is reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of its particular business or enterprise.162 Employers
attempting to use the BFOQ exception as a legal defense must be pre-
pared to explain why its bias on the basis of sex, religion, national
origin or age is truly necessary to the position in the context of the
business or enterprise.163 For example, in Fragante, the court concen-
trated on whether the employment decision based on accent was per-
missible because it was based on a legitimate business reason that
linked the position with effective communication.164
1. History of the BFOQ Defense
Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act encompasses the
the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification defense. This defense is a
Title VII exception, which allows intentional discrimination in some
instances:
Notwithstanding any provision of this subchapter . . . it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and em-
ploy employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fine occupational qualification reasonably neces-
sary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.165
However, “Congress provided sparse evidence of its intent when
enacting the BFOQ exception to Title VII.”166 The Interpretative
Memorandum of Title VII referred to the BFOQ as a “limited excep-
tion to the Act’s prohibition against discrimination, conferring upon
employers a ‘limited right to discriminate on the basis of religion, sex,
162. Nguyen, supra note 65, at 1343.
163. Id. at 1333, n. 43.
164. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596.
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–2(e)(1).
166. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
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or national origin where the reason for the discrimination is a bona
fide occupational qualification.’”167
Congressman Rodino stated, “[t]here may be some instances
where a person of a certain national origin may be specifically re-
quired to meet qualifications of a particular job.”168 As examples of
“legitimate discrimination,” the memorandum refers to “the prefer-
ence of a professional baseball team for male players, the preference
of a French cook for a French restaurant, and the preference of a
business, which seeks the patronage of members of particular relig-
ious groups for a salesman of that religion.”169
Over time, the elements for establishing BFOQ have developed
into a three-part test.170 First, relying on the Interpretive Memoran-
dum, Dothard v. Rawlinson concluded that Congress intended the
BFOQ as an “extremely narrow exception” to Title VII.171 Shortly
thereafter, the EEOC pronounced that the BFOQ in claims based on
sex and national origin should be “interpreted narrowly.”172
2. Judicial Interpretation of the BFOQ Defense
The BFOQ defense is applicable in cases where the discrimina-
tion is “intentional and unintentional.”173 In determining whether a
BFOQ defense will apply, courts established the “essence of the busi-
ness test.”174 The standards for the test were proposed in Diaz v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc.175 There, the court stated that the first
element of the BFOQ defense is a “necessary” reason for discrimina-
tion—the discrimination must be “necessary” for the business to con-
tinue to operate, mere business convenience is insufficient.176 The
second element requires the defendant to provide proof “that he had
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that
all or substantially all” people being discriminated on “would be una-
167. Id. at 297.
168. Perea, supra note 31, at 818–19.
169. 110 CONG.REC. 7213 (Mar. 30, 1964) (April 8, 1964) (Interpretive Memorandum
of Title VII of H.R. 7152 Submitted Jointly by Senator Joseph S. Clark and Senator Clifford
P. Case, Floor Managers).
170. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers of America,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 194 (1991).
171. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
172. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a).
173. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 297.
174. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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ble to efficiently perform the duties of the job involved.”177 The “all or
substantially all” test has applied to a gender-based BFOQ defense, in
which Pan American refused to hire a male for the cabin attendant
position.178 The final element in the BFOQ defense requires proof
that a less discriminatory alternative does not exist.179
a. Customer Preference Defense in Title VII Actions
Notwithstanding Congress’s initial intent to forbid the BFOQ de-
fense based on customer preference, courts often accept this em-
ployer defense when applying the “essence of business” test.180 The
issue in Diaz was whether an airline’s policy that discriminated against
male applicants for the flight attendant position was within the scope
of the BFOQ defense.181 Diaz applied as a flight cabin attendant.182
Pan American Airways did not hire him due to their admitted policy
of only hiring females for the cabin attendant position.183
In Diaz, the District Court held that restricting the position to
females was a BFOQ for the position of an airline attendant because it
found that women were better than men at “providing reassurance to
anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service, and in gen-
eral making flights as pleasurable as possible within the limitations
imposed by the aircraft operations.”184
However, the Fifth Circuit rejected this argument and declared
that Pan American’s policy was not a BFOQ because it was not “rea-
sonably necessary to the normal operation” of business.185 Further,
the court stated “customer preference may be taken into account only
when it is based on the company’s inability to perform the primary
function or service it offers.”186 The court acknowledged the “very nar-
row standard for weighing customer preference” adopted by courts
following Diaz.187
Again in Wilson, the plaintiff challenged Southwest’s female-only
hiring policy.188 The airline argued the BFOQ defense, explaining
177. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
178. Id.
179. Int’l Union, 499 U.S. at 192.
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1972).
181. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 387.
186. Id. at 388.
187. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302, n.24.
188. Id. at 295.
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that it was “crucial to the airline’s continued financial success.”189 The
court held that Southwest Airlines “was not a business where various
sex entertainment was the primary service provided.”190 The court
concentrated on causation to conclude that Southwest “had failed to
establish by competent proof that revenue loss would result directly
from hiring males.”191
IV. Suggested Solutions to Address Accent Discrimination
Congress did not try to protect an employer’s rights to make hir-
ing decisions based on customer attitudes and preferences.192 The
BFOQ exception did not justify “the refusal to hire an individual be-
cause of the preferences of . . . the employer, clients or customers,”
except where “necessary for authenticity.”193 As Congress stated, ac-
cording to the EEOC, the application of BFOQ exception in claims
based on national origin should be applied narrowly.194 “The BFOQ
exception should be limited to situations only where individuals from
different nations cannot perform the duties of the job in question.”195
National origin must also be an actual qualification for job perform-
ance.196 Even though this defense is limited, courts have interpreted it
in accent discrimination cases more generously by allowing employers
to use customer preference arguments.197
A. Rejection of Customer Preference Defense
More often than not, plaintiffs in accent discrimination cases are
unsuccessful.198 In order to change this outcome, the current burden
of proving accent discrimination should be reevaluated in order to
deter employers from discriminating against employees with an accent
based on an enigmatic “customer preference defense.” One solution
is to afford less weight to customer preference. This will allow courts
189. Id. at 293.
190. Id. at 302.
191. Id. at 304.
192. Id.
193. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1972).
194. Wilson, 517 F.Supp. at 297.
195. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Compl. Man. § 604.10(c): THEORIES OF
DISCRIMINATION: STATUTORY DEFENSES (2002).
196. Id.
197. See e.g., Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389 (stating that customer preference is available when it
is based on the “company’s inability to perform the primary function or service it offers.”);
see also Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 937 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (allowing cus-
tomer preference defense to justify a “bona fide occupational qualification.”).
198. Perea, supra note 31, at 830.
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to focus on the actual skills required for a position and whether it is
proficiency in English or the accent that precludes an employee from
successfully performing the job duties. Applying the Matsuda factors
can help facilitate this analysis.199
The current framework of the BFOQ defense places the burden
on the employers to prove that discrimination is “reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”200
Even though courts typically reject customer preference defenses,
cases like Fragante and Pokoscil suggest that employers may use this de-
fense rather broadly, such as when employees are dealing with the
public or students.201
In Fragante, the court accepted “dealing with the public” as a cus-
tomer preference defense.202 There, the court held, and the defen-
dant’s argued, that Fragante’s inability to “deal tactfully and effectively
with the public” was sufficient to deny him employment.203 Likewise
in Poskocil, the court treated students’ complaints regarding under-
standing the teacher due to her accent as a valid BFOQ defense.204
By accepting the customer preference defense, courts have ne-
glected the plaintiff’s ability to perform the job exceptionally.205 By
reevaluating the accepted BFOQ defense, plaintiffs must still prove
that they can competently perform their job, and defendants must
prove that the job necessarily requires an employee to speak without
an accent. The reevaluation of the interpretation of the BFOQ de-
fense may have given Poskocil or Fragante a fair chance in defending
their arguments. Thus, courts should rely less on the customer prefer-
ence defense.
A new judicial approach should ensure there is higher scrutiny of
legitimate and valid reasons against accent discrimination. Finding a
solution to this would not only enable employers to justify their deci-
sions, but the clarification would help raise prospective employee
awareness of the English proficiency required for a position. This ap-
199. Matsuda, supra note 141, at 1368.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e) (1988).
201. See e.g., Fragante, 888 F.2d at 597 (holding that customer preference is available
when it is based on the “important skills required for the position” such as “their communi-
cation skills.”). See also Poskocil, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 259 at *5, n.2 (holding that students’
evaluations regarding the “teacher’s lack of English” was a sufficient defense to reject full
time employment to Poskocil).
202. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 597.
203. Id.
204. Poskocil, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 259 at *1.
205. Id. at 1.
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proach would enable courts to evaluate claims that effective communi-
cation is necessary for the position while ensuring that the customer
preference defense would no longer be accepted as a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason without more valid reasons.
An employer should be required to present evidence that the em-
ployee had difficulty communicating. Special attention should be paid
to the language used as distinguished from the accent in an attempt
to ascertain which of the two is causing difficulties. If an employee is
difficult to understand, the employer should be required to answer
several questions before making any decision regarding the job or po-
sition. Questions such as: Why is it difficult to understand the em-
ployee? Is it due to a lack of proficiency in the English language? Is
the employee soft spoken? Is the employee’s accent impossible to un-
derstand? Finally, the employer should be required to provide prior
evaluations and reviews. This will allow courts to analyze whether the
communication problem is related to an accent or whether some
other prejudice is affecting the employee’s termination or demotion.
By placing a higher burden on the employer to demonstrate the
reasons for their decisions, courts will be better equipped to distin-
guish between accent-based discrimination and English proficiency
issues.
B. Expanding Elements of the BFOQ Test
As the workplace continues to expand, as will its diversity, courts
will face more issues regarding communication and accent discrimina-
tion. Courts acknowledge that “there are some job positions for which
the ability to communicate effectively is a legitimate consideration.”206
Therefore, in some cases, it is appropriate for an employer to make
honest assessments of the oral communications skills of a candidate
for a job when such skills are reasonably related to job
performance.207
When such issues arise, employers may present a model of com-
munication in the workplace, which has three main elements: (1) ef-
fective communication skills are necessary for job X, (2) accent
impedes effective communication, and (3) the applicant speaks with
an accent. If all three elements are found then courts can conclude
that the applicant or employee lacks the necessary skills for the job.208
206. Shieh v. Lyng, 710 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
207. Fragante, 888 F.2d at 596–97.
208. Rosina Lippi-Green, Accent, Standard Language Ideology, and Discriminatory Pretext in
the Courts, 23 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 163, 178–80, 184 (1994).
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However, this assessment must be fair to the plaintiff. A more
thorough approach for the evaluation of the requirements should be
in place. Professor Matsuda offers a number of factors that a court
should take into consideration while evaluating whether there is a
nexus between accent and job duties.209 Matsuda suggests that the fol-
lowing factors will increase the objectivity of court’s assessment of a
plaintiff’s claim: What level of communication is required for the job?
Was the candidate’s speech fairly evaluated? Is the candidate intelligi-
ble to the pool of relevant non-prejudiced listeners, such that job per-
formance is not unreasonably impeded? What accommodations are
reasonable given the job and any limitation in intelligibility.210
The use of these factors will allow courts to evaluate the nature of
the job in question, whether it is primarily oral, and what the conse-
quences of miscommunication are.211 Matsuda emphasizes the impor-
tance of cohesively evaluating and analyzing the conditions, context,
and the amount of contact at the job.212 For example, a dispatcher
speaking to the same truck driver many times a day, where the context
is indirect, over the phone, yet not limited to one-time exchange, nec-
essarily differs from a situation where communication is not distrib-
uted evenly such as a doctor-patient interaction.213
Applying the more extended BFOQ defense to Fragante and Pos-
kocil, the courts may have held differently. In Fragante, the court could
have reviewed Fragante’s interviewing process differently to focus on
whether the accent would impede job performance. The Court
should have used the Matsuda factors to test Fragante’s communica-
tions skills. Again, in Poskocil, the court might have paid less attention
to the impressions of the students, and their possible bias towards
their teacher.
Conclusion
The long history of discrimination against speakers with foreign
accents in the United States suggests that people with accents deserve
adequate protection under Title VII. Further, the strong link between
accent and national origin justifies Title VII protection. Similar to na-
tional origin, accent is practically immutable thus requiring accurate
protection for accent discrimination. Further, by eliminating the cus-
209. Matsuda, supra note 141, at 1367.
210. Id. at 1368.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1370.
213. Id. at 1370–71.
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tomer preference defense in accent discrimination cases, and imple-
menting the Matsuda factors, courts will ensure fair treatment of
prospective employees with accents.
